Future issues ofSymposium will feature philosophical conversations with prominent figures in Continental thought. If it is indeed the fundamental purpose of philosophy, and its publishers, to advance the conversation that we are, it is fitting that we here provide a forum for such dialogue. For decades, the theme ofconversation has figured prominently in several traditions of philosophical inquiry. Our aim in this connection is to bring about a certain rapprochement of theory and practice-insofar, of course, as the spirit of philosophical dialogue may be captured in the page.s of a scholarly journal.
more entrenched in their views on truth, realism, and the conception of philosophy as the overseer of reasoned inquiry. If you agree that this is the case, what do you think about that reaction?
RORTY: The philosophy profession needs the traditional problems about truth, realism, and so on, in order to have transgenerational disciplinary continuity, and in order to retain its self-image as a quasi-science. If people like me had our way, the good old problems would be thrown out. So there would be nothing for philosophy professors to do but reinterpret old books, while hoping for a genius (another Nietzsche, another Wittgenstein) to turn up who would say something new and startling that could then . be tied in with what the old books say. But that would make us just like literary critics, and not at alllike scientists. Anglophone philosophy professors have been trained, and train their students, to think that philosophy is more like a science than like culture chat. The reaction to my work is, in part, an expression of this disciplinary conservatism. The desire to remain a quasi-science accounts also for some of the current neglect of Wittgenstein among analytic philosophers.
PRADO: Of special interest to readers of Symposium is that despite your upbeat discussion of hermeneutics in Philosophy and the Mirror 0/ Nature, you've said surprisingly litde about hermeneutics since then. Did you change your mind ahout the importance of hermeneutics, or do you feel, as you somewhere said about Wittgenstein's thought, that hermeneutical ideas are now too thoroughly incorporated into our way of thinking to provide much intellectual stimulus? R0 RTY: I tossed in Gadamer at the end 0 f that book because I happened to be reading him when I was writing the final chapters. I agree with ll10St of what Gadamer says, but his work, like Wittgenstein's, seems to me largely negative and therapeutic. I don' t think he offers a new enterprise called "henneneutics" for philosophers to engage in. "Hermeneutic philosophy'~is as vague and unfruitful a notion as "analytic philosophy." Both terms signify little more than the dislike of each for the other.
PRADO:
In connection with hermeneutics, it would also be of special interest to Symposium' s readers if you could comment on how you vicw the relation between your work and Heidegger and the phenomenological tradition.
RORTY: I have appropriated a lot of what Heidegger said in his post-1935 works about the history ofphilosophy from Plato to Nietzsche and about the onto-theological tradition as a form of power-worship. But I don't see that this account of Western intellectual history has any particular connection with phenomenology, a form of philosophizing whose utility continues to escape me. It does not seem to me that the early Heidegger took over anything useful from Husserl, and I would prefer to regard the neologisms of Sein und Zeit as imaginative redescriptions of human life rather than as accurate phenomenological reporting. PRADO: You've written much on the philosophy of truth over the years, and you clearly have an enduring interest in Heidegger. I wonder what you make ofHeidegger's rehabilitation of the presocratic conception of truth as aletheia, and whether you see this as having any relevance to your own work on truth. Are you at all sympathetic, for instance, to Heidegger's and Gadamer's claim that there is truth in art?
RORTY: I construe the stuff about aLetheia as a way of saying that what drives history forward is the invention of new truth-candidates (in Ian Hacking' s useful phrase), rather than figuring out which of the old candidates are true and which false. In other words, I think of Heideggerian welterschliesung as imaginative redescription. Art is one form in which things get imaginatively redescribed. But "truth in art" seems to me an unhappy slogan, since it suggests that art can tell us which previous truthcandidates have which truth-value.
PRADO: Sometime prior to the publication of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, I recall that you were supposed to be working on a "big book" on Heidegger. RORTY: In my review of Williarns I explained why I could not find much use for the notion of "intrinsic value." There is a distinction between values I know how to argue for and those I do not. I haven't a clue, for example, how to convince somebody who doubts that avoiding unnecessary human suffering is a good thing. But it seems an empty gesture for me to excuse my rhetorical incapacity by saying that the value in question is "intrinsic."
PRADO: In your contribution toA House Divided (see review in this issue), you speak of"ambidexterity" regarding the ability to read and appreciate the work ofphilosophers on both sides of the analytic-Continental divide. David Hoy cornrnented that you could have described "those who attempt such commensuration as 'bilingual,' for they must be fluent in the vocabularies of each tradition." Do you see a unilingual future for philosophy, a time when those traditions will meld, or do you feel, as some of us do, that philosophy's future is less as a single discipline than as a more abstract aspect of several other disciplines? RORTY: Philosophy can be thought of as a single discipline ifit is viewed as an attempt to relate certain canonical texts (the usual sequence: Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, ... Descartes, Locke, ... Kant, Hegel, ... Mill, Nietzsche ... ) to what is currently happening in various areas of culture. We need philosophy as an academic speciality because we need people who have read these books and who understand the influence they have had and the objections that can be raised against them. The only overlap between the analytics and the Continentals is theircommon familiarity with these texts. I agree \vith Hoy that to become ambidextrous you must become bilingual-as able to appreciate what Heidegger and Gadamer do with Plato as to appreciate what Owen and VIastos do with him. I have no idea whether some day the majority of the world' s philosophy professors will be able to appreciate Vattimo and Brandom equally, and to speak and write in the manner of either, as seems best for the occasion. I have no way of estimating the likelihood of this happy state of affairs.
PRADO: One hears a lot these days about the plight of the humanities. Certainly funding for the humanities has declined and the prestige of an Ans degree has declined with, or ahead of, it. You'll recall that in your debate with John Searle, published in 1999, he expressed concern about what widespread appropriation---or misappropriation~f your, and what we can call postmodern, views was doing to education in the humanities. You responded by saying that Searle was making too much of the activities of a small number of people, largely in literature departments. Do you still feel the same way some five years later? RORTY: I feel uncertain about what is going to happen to the humanities in the Anglophone universities. They were revitalized in the 1970s and the 1980s by being infused with "Continental" philosophical ideas. But by the 1990s the use of these ideas in departments of literature had become so routinized and unimaginative as to be merely irritating. Now areaction has set in. The gurus satirized in Frederic Crews's Postmodern Pooh are widely mocked by young people entering graduate programs in literature. I do not know what literary studies in Anglophone universities will be like twenty years from now, but I would doubt that Lacan, Foucault, and the rest will 100m as large as they do now.
PRADO: In this connection, late in his career lohn Dewey wrote Experience and Education, expressing something very like dismay with how his work was interpreted and implemented by many educators. Do you ever entertain sirnilar feelings about how your work is interpreted and implemented in courses ranging from philosophy to film studies? RORTY: No. There is no point in worrying about how one~s ideas are picked up and used. Habent suafata libelli.
PRADO: I believe that you were at the University of Virginia while E. D. Hirsch was there. rd expect that you were unsympathetic to bis strenuous efforts to reinstate a "core curriculum"; were you unsympathetic, and if so, do you still feel the same way? R0 RTY: On the contrary. I agreed with pretty much everything Hirsch said. I heartily endorse his views in some of the essays included in my Philosophy and Social Hope. I wish that bis "core learning" project could be adopted by all American elementary schools. Dewey, in his day, helped American elementary education break out of an outdated maId. But Dewey's followers went tao far when they began saying "teach the child, not the subjecL" Hirsch's work is a needed corrective to the idea of skillcentered instruction.
